After the British had invaded Fort Lee, Nathanael Greene and George Washington went to New Jersey (Carborne, 2008, p. 49). Greene and the rest of the Continental Army were in low spirits. Greene was still psychologically hunted by his mistake at Fort Washington (Carborne, 2008, p.49). The troop size of the Continental Army had decreased from 28,000 thousand to 6,000. The Continental troops were not in good physical condition either, for they had very little food and clothing. The enlistment period of the soldiers was ending, and most of the remaining soldiers wanted to leave the battlefield (Carborne, 2008, p. 52). George Washington needed a victory before his troops disbanded, and to renew the dying spirit of the American Revolution (Carborne, 2008, p. 52-53).
On Christmas Eve 1776, George Washington met with Greene, other Generals, and other high officials in the house, where Greene was staying. The meeting included future president James Monroe, Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton, and Secretary of War Henry Knox (Carborne, 2008, p. 53). The plan was on Christmas Day the troops would cross the Delaware go to Trenton, New Jersey, and attack 1,400 Hessian soldiers (Carborne, 2008, p. 53). The crossing took place on Christmas Day of 1776, and despite the snow and the 30 degree temperature the Continental Soldiers crossed the Delaware. Greene’s division made contact with the Hessian division at 8 o’clock am, and the fighting lasted one hour. The results were good for the American troops for out 1, 400 Hessians soldiers they took 1,024 prisoners, killed 22, and captured 84 Hessians (Carborne, 2008, p. 57-58). The American army had a good feeling of vengeance, when they saw Colonel Johann Rall, a Hessian who took part in the attack on Fort Washington injured with two bullet holes on his side (Carborne, 2008, p. 54). The evidence, which had shown Greene to be part of the Battle of Trenton was in two letters one to his wife, and to the Governor of Rhode Island, Nicholas Cooke. In the letters, Greene described the horrible weather conditions, and how the army defeated the Hessians (Carborne, 2008, p. 57-58). The Battle of Trenton restored the Americana army’s faith in the American Revolution (Carborne, 2008, p. 58).
Greene then went with the troops on a long eleven mile march to Princeton, NJ. The British army in Princeton was led by Lieutenant Charles Mawhood, who was surprised to see the troops, for he thought General Cornwallis got hold of them in Trenton. However, the American troops snuck away from Cornwallis in the middle of the night (Carborne, 2008, p. 60-61). The battle started out with a skirmish led by American Brigadier Hugh Mercer. The skirmish was located on a snow covered hill near a bare orchard. The British gradually went down the hill bayoneting Mercer’s division, and the division would turn and run. Mercer fought fiercely, but he died when a British soldier cracked his head with a musket, and a bayonet ran through him seven times (Carborne, 2008, p. 61). Greene saw Mercer’s men run through the orchard, and was determined to organize the battle to avoid more deaths. Greene ordered artillery solder Joseph Moulder to bring the four pound cannons in order to help the troops. Greene’s order caused the panicked Mercer’s men to hold their ground, and to continue fight until reinforcement arrived (Carborne, 2008, p. 62). George Washington and two brigades came up to help Mercer’s men with extra musket fire, and Greene directed them to set up canon fire to the left of the British side. The end result of the muskets and the canon fire caused the British to leave the battlefield. The battle of Princeton was described to be an American victory, and a good fox chase (Carborne, 2008, p. 62). In New Jersey, Greene earned success and strong military experience (Buchanan, 1997, p. 269).
George Washington had wanted to go to Brunswick, New Jersey to acquire a British 700000 pound war chest; however, the army did not have the endurance to go all the way up to Brunswick. Therefore, the American army traveled a shorter distance from Princeton into Morristown, New Jersey. The American officers ended up staying long term in Morristown in the winter of 1777 (Corborne, 2008, p. 63). During the army’s stay in Morristown, George Washington sent Greene to Philadelphia to give a report on how the army was doing to Congress (Carborne, 2008, p. 65).
Nathanael Greene did not find his stay in Philadelphia enjoyable. Greene considered cities to be evil, and did not care for the people in Congress. In his letter to Washington Greene wrote how he considered politicians to be very tiring, and waste of his time (Carborne 64- 65). Greene also researched on how Philadelphia would do under an attack, and found the city could not be adequately defended. The only aspect Greene enjoyed in Philadelphia was his comfortable accommodations. Greene stayed in a large estate called Backing Ridge of William Alexander, a fellow general (Carborne, 2008, p. 66). Greene did not stay in very many comfortable locations in the American Revolution, so he was very grateful to stay at a luxurious estate before he went to battle (Carborne, 2008, p. 66).
On September, 8, 1777, 13000 British troops marched in Philadelphia, which caused panic to spread among the American troops (Carborne, 2008, p. 71). In strategy Philadelphia was not important to defend, but symbolically was critical. In 1777, Philadelphia was America’s most populated and affluent city (Carborne, 2008, p. 71). Washington’s first location for the troops to camp in Pennsylvania was in Chadd’s Ford, which was located behind a creek called Brandywine. British General’s Howe’s plan was to split his army into two unequal parts. Howe put his smaller unit of 5,000 troops to march right in front of the Continental Army in Chadd’s Ford. Meanwhile, the rest of Howe’s 8000 troops would sneak behind the Continental Army, while they fought off the smaller troops. Howe’s plan proved to be very intense, but Greene division miraculously formed a line in which covered the approaching attack (Carborne, 2008, p. 74-75). Greene’s division never faltered and managed to hold off the British and Hessian forces, which came up from behind. The Continental Army eventually lost their ground in the Battle of Brandywine, and lost more troops and ammunition than the British army. However, Greene did not view the Battle of Brandywine to be a big loss because he saved many troops in which would have died, if he had not been at the battle (Carborne, 2008, p. 74-75). Greene felt grateful after losing an army in Fort Washington he helped to save one in the Battle of Brandywine (Carborne, 2008, p. 75).
A month after the Battle of Brandywine Greene conducted a battle retreat in Germantown, Pennsylvania (Buchanan, 1997, p. 271). Germantown was a village of stone houses five miles from where the British occupied Philadelphia (Carborne, 2008, p. 75). George Washington, who was in command of the troops had a strategy to divide the eleven thousand American troops in Germantown into four wings. The troops were supposed to march in the evening in order to get to Germantown, for the predawn attack. Greene was given the biggest wing of five thousand troops. Greene had a set back in the journey to Germantown because he lost the trail; however, Greene encouraged his wing to move at a quicker speed so they were able get to Germantown being only a half hour late (Carborne, 2008, p. 76-77). Greene was very fortunate, because some of the other wings did not reach the army camp in Germantown (Carborne, 2008, p. 77). Greene’s division had a good sense of control, when they fought off the British. Greene managed to save most of his men and guns in the Battle of Germantown (Buchanan, 1997, p. 271). The British had won because they held the ground in Germantown, but Greene and the rest of the American army considered Germantown to be a moral victory. The reason was because many British troops had run away in fear, and Greene and other members of the Continental Army enjoyed seeing the British run (Carborne, 2008, p. 79). After, the Battle of Germantown the Army went into winter quarters in Valley Forge, PA (Buchanan, 1997, p. 271).
